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RECENT CASES
to do so would abridge the guarantor's right of revocation, a right often
expressly protected by statute.' 6
But in the instant case, the controversy is between the principal debtor
and the guarantor. Undoubtedly the principal debtor could bind the guar-
antor to his promise to make future advancements, if there were a con-
sideration running between them. The doctrine of promissory estoppel
may serve as a substitute for a consideration, if the principal debtor has
acted in reliance on the promise. 17 The result of the application of these
two rules, while logical, does create a limitation on the privilege of re-
voking fronj the promisor's standpoint, as the instant case illustrates. The
same ruling could be applied in a commercial transaction, since the prom-
issory estoppel rule, by definition, is not limited to charitable transactions.'
It. should be pointed out, however, that the courts have been reluctant to
apply that rule to commercial transactions, the argument being that in
such cases mere reliance upon a gratutitous promise is not a sufficient con-
siderationX to bind the promisor.", The result reached, in any event, seems
to be in line with the hyper-generous attitude of the courts when dealing
with charitable subscriptions.
GERRY 'GLASER
NEGLIGENCE - INVITEES AND LICENSEES - DUTY OF OWNER OR OCCU-
PIER OF LAND TO THIRD PERSON ACCOMPANYING CUSTOMER. - Plaintiff's
husband parked his car near an unguarded grease pit on defendant's serv-
ice station lot; the pit was obscured by another auto which blocked off
the station lights. After completing his business, the husband waited in
the station office for the plaintiff. She crossed the street and walked to-
ward the wrong car, whereupon he directed her toward his car. She then
changed her direction, took a few steps and fell into the pit. The Supreme
Court, in affirming a directed verdict for the defendant, held that since the
plaintiff was not within the class of business visitors, defendant had no
duty to protect her from hidden defects. When her husband completed his
business his status reverted to that of a licensee, and she had no greater
rights than he. ROBILLARD v. TILLOTSON, 103 A.2d 524 (Vt. 1954).
Most authorities agree that a business invitee must be someone on the
premises with an express or implied invitation, and must benefit the owner
actually or potentially., The licensee, in contrast, is on the premises by
permission or sufferance only; anticipated benefit to the owner from his
presence is not necessary. 2 The duty of the landowner to a business invitee
16. N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §22-0106 provides: "A mere offer to guaranty is not
hinding until notice of its acceptance is communicated by the guarantee to the guarantor.
An absolute guaranty is binding upon the guarantor without notice of acceptance."
17. See Florida Asphalt Pavement Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 76 F.2d
326 (5th Cir. 1935); Restatement, Contracts §75(2) (1933).
18. See note 1 supra.
19. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845). "... If generally applied it [promissory
estoppel] would much extend liablility on promises, and that it is at present opposed to
the great weight ot authority." 1 Williston on Contracts 502 (Rev. ed. 1936).
1. See Restatement, Torts §332 (1934); Prosser, Torts §79 (1941); 65 C.J.S., Negli-
gence §43(1).
2. See Restatement, Torts §330 (1934); Prosser, Torts §78 (1941); Cooley, Torts
§340 (Throckmorton's ed. 1930).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
is to make the property reasonably safe in anticipation of his visit and to
notify him of any dangerous conditions,3 while his duty to the licensee is
to refrain from harming him wilfully or wantonly,4 or from setting traps
for him, 5 or from injuring him by active negligence after his presence is
known.6
It seems clear that since an unguarded grease pit is a dangerous con-
dition, the defendant in the instant case was under a duty to notify any
business invitee of its presence. The plaintiff's husband was a business
invitee when he parked his auto and went into the station office to make
his purchases. It remains, then, to determine whether he continued to be
an invitee after his presence ceased to benefit the owner, and whether the
status attached to the wife.
Wives,7 children,8 and friends 9 have often been considered entitled to
the protection owed an invitee, largely on the grounds that the visitor might
not be there unless the guest accompanied him,' 0 or that the guest is in-
cluded for the convenience of the invitee.1 1 More specifically, such ele-
ments as the tender age of the guest,' 2 or a subsequent expressed invita-
tion by the owner 13 or a showing that the invitee is entitled by the in-
herent character of the business to bring guests along 14 have been con-
sidered requisite. Some authorities also give weight to various possible
business advantages from the guest's presence.' 5
If the plaintiff had accompanied her husband to the service station she
undoubtedly would have assumed his invitee status because of the usual
3. See Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts 183 (1926); 38 Am. Jur., Negligence §96.
4. E.g., McMullen v. M & M Hotel Co., 227 Iowa 1061, 290 N.W. 3 (1940); Leuci
v. Sterman, 244 Mass. 236, 138 N.E. 399 (1923); Boneau v. Swift & Co., (Mo. App.),
66 S.W.2d 172 (1934).
5. E.g., Leach v. Isiman, 63 Ga. App. 790, 12 S.E.2d 103 (1940); A "Trap" is a
danger which a person who does not know the premises could not avoid by reasonable
care and skill. Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 32 Ala. App. 348, 26 So.2d
124, 126 (1946).
6. Kakias v. United States Steel Co., 214 F.2d 434 (3rd Cir. 1954); Lewko v. Chas.
A. Krause Milling Co., 179 Wis. 83, 190 N.W. 924 (1922); see Roadman v. C. E. Johnson
Motor Sales, 210 Minn. 59, 297 N.W. 166, 169 (1941).
7. Davis v. Ferris, 29 App. Div. 623, 53 N.Y.Supp. 571 (1898); Welch v. McAllister,
15 Mo. App. 492 (1884).
8. Wheaton v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 295 Ill. App. 618, 15 N.E.2d 64 (1938); Gulf
Refining Co. v. Moody, 172 Miss. 377, 160 So. 559 (1935); Hammontree v. Edison Bros.
Stores, 270 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1954). Contra: Petree v. Davison-Paxon-Stokes Co., 30
Ga. App. 490, 118 S.E. 697 (1923) (Child held to be licensee but recovered under
"attractive nuisance" theory); Fleckenstein v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 91 N.J.L.
145, 102 Atl. 700 (1917).
9. Johnson v. Glasier, 40 S.D. 13, 166 N.W. 154 (1918); see also, Wingrove v. Home
Land Co., 120 W.Va. 100, 196 S.E. 563, 566 (1938); contra: Morse. v. Sinclair Auto
Serv. Corp., 86 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1936).
10. Prosser, Selected Topics on the Law ol Torts 271 (1953).
11. Prosser, Torts 637 (1941).
12. "The same duty which the owner owes to his customer he likewise owes to the
customer's child". Miller v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 104 Mo. App. 609, 78 S. W.
682 (1904); accord, Grogan v. O'Keefe's, Inc., 267 Mass. 189, 166 N.E. 721 (1929);
Carlisle v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 137 'rex. 220, 152 S.W.2d 1073 (1941).
13. Gordon v. Freeman, .193 Minn. 97, 258 N.W. 19 (1934); see Kennedy v. Phillips,
319 Mo. 573, 5 S.W.2d 33, 37 (1928) (Guest was considered an invitee in his own right
after presence acknowledged).
14. Kelley v. Goldberg, 288 Mass. 79, 192 N.E. 513 (1934); see Wingrove v. Home
Land Co. 120 W.Va. 100, 196 S.E. 563, 566 (1938).
15. See Kennedy v. Phillips, 319 Mo. 573, 5 S.W.2d 33, 38 (1928) (Court concluded
the guest was an invitee in his own right because of the possibility that he might purchase
something); see Restatement, Torts 1332 comm. C.
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practice of service stations to make services available to customers and
guests alike.18 Would the plaintiff acquire the business invitee status when
she came to meet her husband later, instead of accompanying him, irrespec-
tive of whether she arrived before, during, or after the business was con-
summated? Is meeting an invitee a purpose for which a service station
is thrown open?
The instant court concluded that the husband's status as a business
visitor ended when after he had completed his business he choose to re-
main in the office and wait for his wife. The invitation, expressed or im-
plied, did not contemplate his use of the premises as a waiting place.' 7
Presumably, the visitor would be "protected", under this view, only for a
length of time sufficient for him to reach his auto and drive away.1 8
The preferred position of an invitee can be changed to that of a "mere",
"bare" or "gratuitous" licensee while he is on the premises. 10 This con-
version, however, has traditionally resulted from a venture into a restricted
area,
2 0 
or some other conduct of the invitee beyond the spirit of the in-
vitation.2 ' Some cases do hold that waiting beyond a reasonable length
of time also converts the invitee into a licensee.
22
The court in the instant case did not state whether the plaintiff would
have been entitled to compensation had her husband retained his status
of a business invitee. It merely concluded that under the circumstances
presented, the status of the principal governed.23 Thus the guest's status is
derivative rather than of his own right. A rigid application of this rule
might require that if a child accompanied its parent shopping and the par-
ent went into a restricted area, thus becoming a licensee, and the child
was injured outside the restricted area, the child would be denied recov-
ery because of the parent's frolic. Had the wife, in the instant case, joined
her husband before conclusion of his business, application of this "status
by derivation" theory would enable her to recover.
Louis R. MOORE
INSURANCE LIMIT OF LIABILITY - MEANING OF "EACH ACCIDENT". -
Plaintiff's truck was negligently operated so as to collide with a freight train
and damage sixteen cars owned by fourteen separate companies. Plaintiff's
insurance contract obligated defendant insurer to pay $5,000 property dam-
age for "each accident" involving the insured. After suit was brought against
16. See Wingrove v. Home Land Co., 120 W.Va. 100, 196 S.E. 563, 566 (1938) "It
would be strange indeed if the owner of an automobile driving into a filling station with
members of his family, or with selected and invited guests, would be held to be an invitee,
rnd the other occupants mere licensees."
17. Instant case at 528-9.
18. See Prosser, Torts §79 (1941) (Invite has right to safe exit).
19.. See Prosser, Torts §79 (1941); 65 C.J.S. Negligence §46 p. 535, note 35.
20. E.g. Wilson v. *Goodrich, 218 Iowa 462, 252 N.W. 142 (1943); Keeran v.
Spurgeon Mercantile Co., 194 Iowa 1240, 190 N.W. 99 (1922); Pellicot v. Keene, 181 Md.
138, 28 A.2d 826 (1942).
21. Southwest Cotton Co. 4'. Pope, 25 Ariz. 364, 218 P. 152 (1923); Lerman Bros.
v. Lewis. 277 Ky. 334, 126 S.W.2d 461 (1939); see Hickman v. First Nat. Bank of
Great Falls, 112 Mont. 398, 117 P.2d 275, 277 (1941); Prosser, Torts §79 (1941).
22. Heinlein v. Boston & P. R. Co., 147 Mass. 136, 16 N.E. 698 (1888).
23. See Meyer v. Manzer, 179 Misc. 355, 39 N.Y.S. 5, 7 (1943).
